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THE ARGUMENT FROM RELIGIOUS 
EXPERIENCE: A NARROWING 
OF ALTERNATIVES 
Richard J. Ketchum 
One position on the epistemic status of religious experiences is what I call 
the liberal position: those who have had a religious experience are justified 
on its basis in believing in God but the testimony of those who have had 
religious experiences does not justify others in believing in God. I argue that, 
though the liberal position is popular, it is unreasonable. The principle I use 
to support this view seems also to support an argument which appeals to 
religious experience as evidence that God exists. I argue that onus of proof 
considerations block the inference, however. 
An 'argument from religious experience; as I somewhat loosely use the term 
here, is an argument which attempts to find evidence for the existence of God 
in the testimony of those who claim that they have directly experienced Him. 
One position taken with respect to the cogency of such arguments is that though 
a) those who have had religious experiences are indeed justified by virtue of 
having had such experiences alone, and not by virtue of any argument, in believing 
that God exists, nevertheless b) the testimony of such people does not justify others 
in believing that God exists. Let me call this position the "liberal position." In the 
first part of this paper, I argue that the liberal position is, with only a few qualifi-
cations, an unreasonable position. This leaves us, those of us who have not had a 
religious experience, with two reasonable conservative positions. The "theistic 
conservative position" is the position that religious experiences justify those who 
have them in believing that God exists and the testimony of these people justifies 
the rest of us. The other conservative position, which I somewhat misleadingly call 
the "atheistic conservative position," is that neither those who have religious expe-
riences nor those who hear their testimony are justified in believing in God. The 
argument of part I of this paper, the argument that the liberal position is unreason-
able, appears to lend credence to the theistic conservative position. The argument 
of part I does establish a premise required to support the theistic conservative 
position and in this weak sense supports that position. I will argue in part II, 
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however, that onus of proof considerations prevent the theist from using the 
argument of part I to increase the likelihood of his conservative position. 
I 
I artificially assume that the word "God" has a relatively clear meaning 
shared by all who use the word. I simply want to avoid controversy concern-
ing the meaning and meaningfulness of religious language. Within limits, the 
reader may supply his own definition. For present purposes, the only restric-
tions on a definition are a) that the definition must not rule out the possibility 
that God is experienced and b) that it must specify what some have meant by 
the word when they have asserted, "I have had an experience of God." 
I understand a religious experience to be any experience which causes the 
experiencer to believe that he is aware of God. This definition is narrow in 
that it restricts the object of religious experiences to God, as opposed to 
witches or Odin, but broad in that the experience can range from an ineffable 
mystical experience to an apparent awareness that God is protecting one from 
evil. A veridical religious experience is an experience which causes the ex-
periencer to have the true belief that she is aware of God. A justified religious 
experience is a religious experience which justifies the experiencer in accept-
ing the belief that she is aware of God. I will assume that one who is justified 
in believing that she is aware of God is, thereby, justified in believing that 
God exists. Whether or not a religious experience can be justified for one 
person and not for another is an open question. That is to say, it mayor may 
not be the case that an experience which justifies one person, S, in believing 
that S is aware of God would also justify anyone else, T, in believing that T 
is aware of God were T to have the experience. These definitions would 
clearly be inadequate in a context of investigating what, if anything, can be 
learned about God from religious experiences other than that He exists. They 
will, however, suit present purposes since it is arguments for the existence 
of God we will be concerned with here. 
The liberal position with respect to religious experience is fairly popular. 
Two of William James' conclusions concerning whether or not mystical ex-
periences provide evidence for the existence of God are as follows.' 
(1) Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have a right to 
be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come. 
(2) No authority emanates from them which should make it a duty for those 
who stand outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically. 
James leaves little doubt that in (1) he means to assert that mystics are 
justified in holding those beliefs acquired in the mystical experience. "They 
have been 'there' and knoW."2 "Our own more 'rational' beliefs are based on 
evidence exactly similar in nature to that which mystics quote for theirs."3 
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Those mystics then who believe that during their mystical experience they 
were aware of or were experiencing God are, according to James, justified 
in believing as they do. 
The second claim can be understood as a trivial truth. There are those who 
believe that nothing should be accepted uncritically. James' conclusion is not 
so insipid, however. "Its [the mystical experience's] value must be ascer-
tained by empirical methods, so long as we are not mystics ourselves ... non-
mystics are under no obligation to acknowledge in mystical states a superior 
authority conferred on them by their intrinsic nature."4 The non-mystic then 
is not justified in believing in God by the fact that mystics have claimed to 
experience Him. " ... [m]ystics have no right to claim that we ought to accept 
the deliverance of their peculiar experience, if we are ourselves outsiders and 
feel no private call thereto."5 The problem is not that we have reason to doubt 
the sincerity of the mystic. Mystical experiences simply are experiences 
which justify those who have them in certain beliefs; but the fact that they 
occur does not justify others in accepting those beliefs. 
More recently, William Rowe has cited James' position and stated, "It is 
unlikely that the studies of mysticism over the intervening years have inval-
idated these conclusions."6 Rowe interprets (2) above as claiming that "we 
non-mystics have no good reason for regarding mystical experience as verid-
ical and no good reasons for regarding them as delusory."7 He interprets (1) 
as the claim that mystics are justified in regarding their experiences as ve-
ridical. Rowe doubts that mystical experience justifies even the mystic in 
believing in the theistic God but this is due to the fact that mystics typically 
do not claim to experience something as omnipotent, omniscient, benevolent, 
etc. If I understand Rowe's concurrence with James' first conclusion cor-
rectly, the mystic would be justified in believing in the theistic God if it 
seemed to the mystic that the theistic God was revealing Himself to the mystic 
as such. 
George Mavrodes, after arguing that we can have no criterion for deter-
mining whether a religious experience is a deception of the Devil or not, 
quotes an uncharacteristic passage from the works of St. Teresa, in which she 
claims knowledge of the presence of God without such a criterion. Mavrodes 
comments that 
Teresa is here giving her testimony that, as this experience presented itself to her, 
its veridicality-the fact that it laid hold of a truth and delivered that truth to her 
understanding-was so plain and open on the face of that experience itself that 
its purpose was accomplished. The truth was 'engraven upon the understanding,' 
and doubt was banished. And it is this sort of experience, I think, and not the 
use of criteria, which is basic in Teresa's mystical knowledge.8 
Mavrodes compares the degree of certainty which accompanies S1. Teresa's 
belief that she was, in a mystical experience, aware of God with the certainty 
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accompanying a belief that a specific argument [which in fact is a straight 
forward modus ponens argument] is of the form modus ponens. He concludes, 
Teresa's fundamental epistemological strategy, then, is one which is common 
to us all. If she is mistaken in substance, then, either her mistake is not 
traceable to this strategy, or else all of us, mystics and non-mystics alike, 
stand on equally shaky ground.9 
Mavrodes must be telling us here that st. Teresa is justified in believing that 
she was aware of God. Her belief is as justified as Mavrodes' belief that a 
particular obvious instance of a modus ponens argument is such. 
Mavrodes does not believe, however, that if one accepts "this line of argu-
ment" we (non-mystics) must accept Teresa's experiences as veridical. 
Teresa had her experiences, but she has not given them to us. She has instead 
given to us a description of them, a report .... It may be that what happened 
to Teresa engraved something on her soul which her description will not 
engrave on our souls. lO 
All of this is of course true but it is hard to see how it is relevant, since it is 
true of the relation of reports of experiences to experiences generally and 
some reports do justify. If you, whom I know to be a competent logician, tell 
me that you can see that the first argument on page 34 of Principia Ethica is 
a modus ponens argument, in typical circumstances, I take you to have had 
an experience which justifies you in believing that this is so. Your report 
justifies me in believing that the argument is a modus ponens argument in 
spite of the fact that your report does not supply me with the experience which 
justified you and in spite of the fact that your experience "engraves some-
thing" on your soul which your report does not engrave upon mine. 
Louis Pojman cites James' two conclusions listed above and agrees with 
them.ll He thinks that the realization that those who have had mystical ex-
periences are justified in believing that God exists does not justify those who 
have not had a mystical experience (perhaps also those who do not believe 
that God exists) because there are no publicly verifiable tests of the hypoth-
esis that God exists. There are however, no publicly verifiable tests of the 
hypothesis that I am now imagining a fire truck but if you think that I am 
justified in believing on the basis of some experience that I am now imagining 
a fire truck you would also, typically, think of yourself as justified in believ-
ing that I did in fact imagine a fire truck. The point is that it is not at all clear 
why pUblicity of tests is relevant once it is decided that the experiencer is 
justified in a belief by virtue of having the experience. 
Given the popularity of the liberal position it seems worthy of careful consid-
eration. For, on the face of it, it seems unreasonable. Consider ordinary percep-
tual cases. You tell me Reagan was in a certain parade and when pressed for a 
justification you tell me you saw him in the parade. If I do not doubt your 
sincerity, I believe that you had an experience which, all else being equal, 
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justifies you in believing that Reagan was in the parade. 12 For me to deny 
under these circumstances that Reagan was in the parade would at the very 
least make appropriate your request for a justification of my denial. It would 
also make appropriate a request for an explanation of why I believe as I do 
in the face of evidence that he was in the parade, namely, your testimony. 
Before trying to state the principle needed to justify the claim that the 
liberal position is unreasonable, let me clarify my understanding of the liberal 
position. It is possible that those to whom I have attributed the liberal position 
have overstated their case. Their position may simply be that the justified 
belief that others have had justified religious experiences does not rationally 
force or obligate those who have this belief to accept the claim that God 
exists. If this is their position it is a reasonable one that can be defended. Let me 
suppose that if S believes the sentence, N, and realizes that N entails M, then S 
ought to refrain from believing not-M (or give up N). The word "ought" is 
intended in the last sentence to express a purely epistemic obligation and the 
sentence is plausible when the word is understood in this way. It is less clear, 
however, that experience either imposes purely epistemic obligations or would 
impose them if we were free to choose our perceptual beliefs. Most of us have 
no choice but to believe, e.g., that there is a pencil in one's hand when we see 
and feel it there. Suppose however that someone, through a great deal of mental 
exercise, was able to make believing such things a matter of choice. Suppose 
further that this person realizes that were she to choose to believe, on any 
particular occasion, what the rest of us are caused by our sense experience to 
believe, she would be justified in these beliefs. Does she have an epistemic 
obligation to choose to believe, e.g., that she is holding a pencil when it seems 
to her just as if she is holding a pencil? It might be prudentially unreasonable to 
believe that there is no pencil there but suspension of belief seems to me to be 
a permissible option from a purely epistemic point of view. Suspension of belief 
might be imprudent or even in certain circumstances immoral or impolite. One 
who tries to suspend belief whenever he is less than certain may be acting 
foolishly (imprudently) but I do not see that the behavior is irrational. 
If this is true, it would also seem true that S, who believes that T is justified 
in believing that p on the basis of some experience, is not by that very fact 
obligated to believe that p. If the experience which justifies T in believing 
that p does not obligate T to believe that p, it is difficult to see how S could 
be obligated to believe that p by having the justified belief that T had an 
experience justifying T in believing that p. If those to whom I have attributed 
the liberal position have merely intended to point out that being justified in 
believing that others have had justified religious experiences does not obli-
gate (epistemically) one to believe in God, I would agree. Some of James' 
comments suggest that he is making this point. The view I find unreasonable 
is the view that both a) some people have had justified religious experiences 
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and also b) those who have a justified belief to the effect that a) is true would 
not be justified in believing that God exists if they were to believe that He 
exists. l3 Its seeming for all the world to me as if I have a pencil in my hand 
does not obligate me to believe that I have a pencil in my hand though it 
would justify me in believing this if I did believe it. So too, I will argue, even 
though S's justified belief that T has had a justified religious experience does 
not obligate S to believe that God exists, it would justify S in believing this 
if he in fact believed it. I am assuming that it is not irrational to say "In all 
probability p but I choose not to believe p" or "We have strong reasons to 
believe that p but I choose not to believe that p." Those who believe that we 
do have an epistemic obligation to believe what we would be very justified 
in believing were we to believe it, can make relevant adjustments in my 
claims. My conclusion will be correspondingly stronger. 
It is also possible that those to whom I have attributed the liberal position 
have overstated their case in another way. Perhaps, they mean merely to claim 
that others may have had justified religious experiences but (since we do not 
know that they have) their testimony does not justify those of us who have 
not had justified religious experiences in believing that God exists. I do not 
mean to deny this possibility. Clearly, the realization that others may, for all 
we know, be justified in believing in God does not justify those who realize 
this in believing that God exists. 
The principle needed to show the unreasonabiIity of the liberal position is 
as follows: 
P: If S is justified in believing that T is justified in believing that p on the basis 
of some experience and S has no justified belief, q, such that were T to be 
justified in believing that q T would not be justified in believing that p, then 
were S to believe that p, S would be justified in believing that p. 
Note that if P is true then so too is the weaker principle, P', whose antecedent 
is the same as P but whose consequent reads, "were S to believe that not-p, 
S would be unjustified in believing that not-p." For surely if someone would 
be justified in believing that p he would be unjustified in believing that not-po 
The point as applied to religious experience is that if James, Rowe, etc. can 
justify their opinion that those who have had a religious experience are in 
fact justified in believing that God exists and if P is true then there is a 
straightforward way of showing the atheist that his position is unreasonable. 
There is a straightforward way of showing the atheist that he is not justified 
in believing that God does not exist. 
By way of clarification let me apply P to a few cases. First the unproblematic 
case. You tell me that you saw Reagan in a parade in Chicago's loop. I believe, 
trusting in your sincerity, that you had a visual experience which justifies you 
in believing that Reagan was in said parade. This belief of mine is justified 
by your testimony. I have no reason to believe that Reagan was in fact in 
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Santa Barbara or that you were hallucinating. Were I to believe that Reagan 
was in the parade, as most normal people would, I would be justified in so 
believing. A more complicated case: I ask you to hand me the green pencil 
on my desk and you hand me the yellow one which looks green because of 
the special lighting in my office. Your behavior justifies me in believing that 
you believed that the pencil you handed me was green. Your belief, I realize, 
is justified given the lighting which makes it look green. But I would not 
under these circumstances be justified in believing that the pencil was green. 
For I am justified in believing something which is such that if you believed 
it and if you were justified in believing it, you would not be justified in 
believing that the pencil was green, namely, that the lighting in my office 
makes yellow things look green. One final case: I know that we are in a 
habitat in which it would be very unlikely to see a sparrow but in which 
longspurs, a sparrow-like bird, typically abound. You, who know little about 
birds and their habitat, report having just seen a sparrow. Your belief, I judge, 
is justified but I would not be justified in believing that it was a sparrow you 
saw on the basis of your testimony, since I have relevant knowledge which 
you do not possess, namely: this is not sparrow habitat and/or this is longspur 
habitat and/or longspurs look much like sparrows. 
I think that pointing out examples such as these without reference to P 
makes one realize that the liberal position needs a kind of support it does not 
receive. Those who hold the liberal position do not guess or speculate or hold 
on faith that those who have had religious experiences are justified in believ-
ing in God. They think that this is the reasonable, justified position to take. 
But given this, the above examples make it fairly clear that something needs 
to be said to explain why we are not justified in believing that God exists on 
the basis of the testimony of those who have had religious experiences. It 
further seems that the explanation would have to point to some special knowl-
edge possessed only by those who have not had religious experiences. 
Before trying to support P, let me first point out a defense of P that fails. 
We cannot argue for P by pointing out that if S is justified in believing that 
T has had an experience justifying T in believing that p, then S is justified 
in believing that were S himself to have that experience, S would thereby be 
justified in believing that mutatis mutandis p.14 For this is false. Suppose that 
you are an expert at bird identification and that I am not and that we both 
have equally good views of a bird. Your confident assertion that it is a Swamp 
Sparrow justifies me, in the normal case, in believing that you have had an 
experience justifying you in believing that we are in the presence of a Swamp 
Sparrow. However, my ignorance of what Swamp Sparrows look like is 
enough to explain why your (visual) experience would not justify me in 
believing that I was looking at a Swamp Sparrow were I to have it. Also, if 
S were blind from birth probably none and certainly few of T's visual expe-
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riences are such that if S were suddenly to have them they would justify S 
in believing mutatis mutandis as T did. The relatively straightforward point 
is that whether or not an experience justifies a person in believing something 
may depend on the person's past experience and background knowledge. IS 
The point is relevant to mystical experiences and religious experience gen-
erally. Our being justified in believing that another has had an experience 
which justifies him in believing that God exists, does not justify us in believ-
ing that the experience would have justified us in believing in God if we had 
had it even assuming that we satisfy the other conditions in the antecedent 
of P. It is I think often assumed by those who have not had religious experi-
ences that to evaluate the claims of those who say they have experienced 
God, they would have to have the experience themselves. In fact, having the 
experience would not obviously help in evaluating the extent to which the 
experience justifies the relevant belief. 
The argument for P, such as it is, runs as follows: to believe that another 
is justified in believing something, for whatever reason, is to believe that the 
belief has something to be said for it, it passes muster. Furthermore, there is 
enough to be said for it to be able to conclude that the holder of the belief is 
justified, within his rights, in holding it. Now suppose that S has no reason 
or evidence to doubt that p which is not possessed also by T and that S 
justifiably believes that T is justified in believing that p. (Note that if being 
justified is a matter of being caused by a reliable process to believe, then S, 
in believing that T is justified in believing p believes that T was caused to believe 
that p by a reliable process.) Under these conditions S justifiably believes that 
there is enough to be said for p to justify T's believing it and nothing to be said 
against p not already taken into account in assessing T's justification. Though it 
does not follow logically that S would be justified in believing that p were he 
to believe p, it is difficult to see how he could fail to be. 
Somewhat polemic support may be supplied for P by pointing out that some 
such principle seems to be assumed by any attempt to justify a belief by 
'appeal to authority,' where the authority'S belief is justified by perceptual 
experience. If S justifies his belief that there no longer are any elms on Elm 
Street by telling us that he has just spoken with T who testifies to having 
been there and having seen none, we do not shake our heads in wonderment 
at the gullibility of S. S in accepting T's testimony did, in the normal case, 
the reasonable thing. 
P does, however, make an assumption and it is one that can be doubted. 
The assumption is, 
R: If a given experience justifies U in believing that p then it would justify 
anyone else, V, who was just like U in all epistemica11y relevant respects, 
in believing that p.16 
Before explaining why I think that P assumes the truth of R let me briefly clarify 
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R. An epistemic feature is to be thought of as a belief or system of beliefs, 
intelligence and/or belief forming mechanisms, past or present experience, 
awareness of or ability to become aware of relations between beliefs, etc. Could, 
for example, U be justified on the basis of a visual experience in believing that 
he is looking at a Dusky Flycatcher while V, who is just like U in all (other) 
epistemically relevant respects, is not justified in believing this on the basis of 
the same experience? R denies the possibility. If we answer affirmatively we 
might try to explain how this could happen by saying that V needs more evidence 
to be (not merely to think that he is) justified than U does. Saying this, however, 
seems to repeat the point rather than to explain it. We could almost rule out by 
definition the possibility that two people differ in being justified but in no other 
epistemic feature. Suppose we defined an "epistemically relevant difference 
between U and V relative to the belief that p" as any difference between U and 
V which would explain why U is but V is not justified in believing that p. Given 
this definition, the only way to maintain that U might be justified when V is not, 
even though U and V differ in no epistemically relevant respect, is by maintain-
ing that sometimes the fact that people differ with respect to being justified is a 
brute, inexplicable fact about the people and the belief. 
I will, however, leave the notion of an epistemically relevant difference be-
tween people undefined. I assume that we have (linguistic) intuitions as to 
whether or not a feature or characteristic of a person or belief is epistemically 
relevant. Finally, I assume that if U has a belief which prevents him from being 
justified in believing that p on the basis of some experience but V does not, then 
there is an epistemically relevant difference between U and V with respect to 
the belief that p. For example, if U knew, but V did not, that the light in a 
particular room made yellow things look green, then there would be an episte-
mically relevant difference between U and V with the respect to the belief that 
this (yellow) pencil is yellow. 
If P is true, then R must be as well. For, suppose that R is false. On this 
supposition, it is possible for two people to be just like each other III all episte-
mically relevant respects except that one is and one is not justified on the basis 
of some experience in believing that p. Thus, it would be possible for the 
antecedent of P to be satisfied even though S would not be justified in believing 
that p were S to have had the experience T had instead of hearing T's testimony. 
But T's testimony can confer no more justification on S's belief that p than the 
experience itself would have as long as we are assuming that Sand T are alike in 
all epistemically relevant respects. So, it is possible for P to have a true antecedent 
and a false consequent and thus P, considered as a lawlike proposition, is false. 
Since few, if any, would contend that R is false I will assume that R is true in 
what follows. I have mentioned it here for two reasons. First, contemplating the 
implausibility of the claim that R is false increases confidence in P. I can think 
of no way of arguing that P is false, or of seeing how P might be false, other 
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than by assuming that R is false. Those who do not recognize the possibility 
that R is false can take the fact that it is not possible for two people to differ 
in being justified without further epistemic differences to be additional sup-
port for P. For it does seem that P holds otherwise. Second, since I do not 
argue, and do not know how to argue, that R is true, there is a weakness in 
my argument. Those who believe that the consequences of accepting Pare 
false can justly protest that P stands in need of justification. 
II 
If we accept P, we must, it seems, give up the liberal position. We must 
either refrain from claiming to be justified in believing that there are justified 
religious experiences or refrain from claiming that others would not be jus-
tified by the testimony of those who have had justified religious experiences 
in believing that God exists were they to believe. We are not thereby forced 
to accept either the theistic or the atheistic conservative position. We have 
the option of simply withholding belief both as to whether there are justified 
religious experiences and/or as to whether testimony that there are such 
experiences justifies others in believing in God. If we choose to take a stand 
on these issues, however, we must believe that both are justified or that 
neither are. I say all of this assuming that those who have not had religious 
experiences have no relevant information not possessed by those who have. 
Furthermore, it would seem that recognition that P is true supports the theistic 
conservative position. For, although there is no standard version of the argument 
from religious experiences any such argument must, it seems, assume the truth 
of some principle such as P. One first argues that it is possible for an experience 
to be a justified religious experience, Le., it is possible for an experience to justify 
the experiencer in believing that God exists. One then appeals to the testimony 
of those who claim to have had a justified religious experience for evidence that 
such experiences have actually occurred. It is concluded that we are justified on 
the basis of this testimony in believing that God exists. A more precise version 
of the argument I will refer to as "the modus ponens argument" runs as follows. 
(I use "we" in the argument as an abbreviation of "those who have not had a 
religious experience but have heard the testimony of those who claim that they 
have had a justified religious experience.") 
(1) P 
(2) We are justified in believing that others have had justified religious 
experiences. 
(3) We are justified in believing nothing which is such that were those who 
have had religious experiences to be justified in believing it they would 
not be justified in believing that God exists. 
So, if we were to believe that God exists we would be justified in believing 
that God exists. 
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To the extent that arguments from religious experience for the existence of God 
rely on P, I have buttressed these arguments by arguing for P. Just how good is 
the modus ponens argument? The third premise is relatively uncontroversialP 
The argument is valid and the first premise is justified. This leaves premise (2). 
While this premise might reasonably be doubted, we do have a good idea as to 
how to investigate further into its truth. The testimony of those who have had 
religious experiences is surely relevant and indeed the existence of such testi-
mony seems to create a presumption in favor of (2). That is to say, the fact that 
we are aware of the testimony of those who claim that they have been aware of 
God seems to place the onus of proof on those who would deny (2). As James 
has put it, "they [mystics] have been 'there' and know." 
Perhaps, however, P can be put to equally good use by the atheistic con-
servative. Consider what I will call the modus tollens argument below. 
(1) P 
(2) It is not the case that we would be justified in believing that God exists 
if we in fact believed. 
(3) We are justified in believing nothing which is such that were those who 
have had religious experiences to be justified in believing it, they would 
not be justified in believing that God exists. 
So, it is not the case that we are justified in believing that there are justified 
religious experiences. 
This argument seems far weaker than the modus ponens argument. In the 
present context it seems to beg the question against the theistic conservative 
and even more so against the person who has had a religious experience and 
believes it to be a justified religious experience. Furthermore, the second 
premise is far from obvious. It stands in need of justification itself. Granted, 
the second premise of the modus ponens argument also stands in need of 
justification. But there we know how to go about finding it. We find evidence 
for premise (2) of the modus ponens argument in the testimony of those who 
have had religious experience. I know of no general arguments, on the other 
hand, to the effect, that with the possible exception of those who have had a 
religious experience, no one is justified in believing in God. 
The appearance that the modus ponens argument is a stronger more cogent 
argument than the modus tollens argument is, I think, mere appearance. Does 
the sincere testimony of the mystic justify those of us who have not had 
religious experiences in believing that there are justified religious experi-
ences? In fact this is a much debated topic. IS The jury is still out as to whether 
the second premise of the modus ponens argument is true or itself justified. 
Once the many problems involved in arguing either for or against this premise 
are realized the appearance that the modus pOTlens argument is stronger than 
the modus tollens argument with respect to the justification of their respective 
second premises should, I think, begin to fade. 
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The second purported disanalogy between the modus ponens and modus 
tollens argument remains; the modus tollens argument begs the question, it 
is suggested, against the theistic conservative but not vice versa. Perhaps the 
appearance that this is so dissolves once it is seen that the second premise of 
each argument is controversial. I will assume, however, that this is not the 
case. I want to argue that even granting the strong feeling that the modus 
tollens argument begs the question against the theistic conservative while the 
modus ponens argument does not beg the question against the atheistic con-
servative, still that feeling is beside the point. If one argument begs the 
question against the other, they both do. 
lt is easy to point out that the second premise of each is the negation of 
the conclusion of the other and that the other two premises of each are exactly 
the same. It seems to follow that the way to evaluate the arguments is to find 
evidence for or against their second premises without using the other argu-
ment to do this. Still the feeling persists. The modus ponens argument can 
legitimately be used to cast doubt on the second premise of the modus tollens 
argument but not vice versa. The importance of this feeling, or rather the 
unimportance of it, will become clear I think when it is pointed out that that 
feeling persists in other contexts, contexts in which it is clearer that the 
feeling should be given little or no weight. I have in mind the skeptical 
arguments involving the possibility of our being deceived by an evil genius 
or of our being a brain in a vat. 
There are two types of belief which, it has been argued, not even an all 
powerful being could give us false tokens of. First, there are beliefs descrip-
tive of our own states of consciousness, e.g., the belief that I have a headache 
or the belief that I seem to see something green. Second, there are the beliefs 
expressed by analytic sentences, e.g., the belief that all bachelors are unmar-
ried. Let me call both of these types of belief, "privileged beliefs." I then 
define an "evil genius" as one who makes all of my non-privileged beliefs 
false. The skeptical argument now runs as follows. 
(1) I do not know that there is no evil genius. 
(2) I know that if there is an evil genius then none of my non-privileged 
beliefs are true. 
So, I do not know any of my non-privileged beliefs to be true. 
Given a reasonably lax definition of validity, the argument is valid. But now 
consider the following 'gnostic argument' which attempts to cast doubt on 
the first premise. 
(1) I know at least one non-privileged belief to be true. 
(2) I know that if there is an evil genius then none of my non-privileged 
beliefs are true. 
So, I know that there is no evil genius. 
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Note the similarity between this pair of arguments and the modus ponens and 
tollens arguments concerning religious experience. Both pairs are couched in 
epistemic terms. Both have as a conclusion of one member of the pair the 
negation of a premise of the other and they have the remaining premise(s) in 
common. The premises of each are plausible when considered outside of a 
context in which the two arguments are compared. There are those who 
continue to feel that the gnostic argument begs the question against the 
skeptic but not vice versa. In the case of this pair of arguments, however, it 
is clear that the demand to explain the disanalogy, if there is one, is justified. 19 
The demand in the case of the pair of arguments concerning religious expe-
rience is equally justified. Until some disanalogy is pointed out, the truth of 
P supports theistic conservativism no more than atheistic conservativism. 
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